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INTRODUCTION 
The first generation of academic scholarship on the Internet pro-
claimed that its transnational nature rendered it inherently unregulable 
by conventional governments. Instead, the Internet would be governed 
by rules and customs developed by members of the online community 
itself.1 Although most of these early Internet theorists remained some-
what vague about the mechanism through which such norms and struc-
tures might arise, some suggested that they might emerge through inter-
national standard setting organizations or the system for resolving 
domain name disputes.2 As a model for how such system might emerge, 
they pointed to the lex mercatoria, which is generally characterized as a 
set of uniform legal principles developed during medieval times on be-
half of traveling merchants that was based on the customs and practices 
of international trade, enforced by special merchant courts, and inde-
pendent of local governments and their laws.3  
Other scholars expressed skepticism about the Internet’s supposed un-
regulability.4 Indeed, such claims would ultimately be contradicted by 
events such as the United States’ unilateral efforts to block the creation 
                                                                                                                                       
1. For the leading scholarly exposition, see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Bor-
ders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1387–91 (1996). For a somewhat 
polemical statement of this position, see John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.  
2.  See Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 1388 (domain name disputes); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex 
Informatica: The Formation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
553, 586–87 (1998) (standard setting organizations). 
3. Perhaps the leading proponent of this position is Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 553–55. For 
earlier articles advancing similar arguments, see Anne W. Branscomb, Overview: Global Govern-
ance of Global Networks, in TOWARD A LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 1, 21 
(Anne W. Branscomb ed., 1986); Paul Frissen, The Virtual State: Postmodernisation, Informatisa-
tion and Public Administration, in THE GOVERNANCE OF CYBERSPACE 111 (Brian D. Loader ed., 
1997); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 
1019–21 (1994); Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 1389–91; Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: 
Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211 (1997); Henry H. Perritt, 
Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 461–63 (1997); Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts on the Net: 
Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (1996). 
4. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 24–60 (1999); 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998). 
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of the .xxx domain on the Internet,5 the influence of governments and 
large corporations over international standard setting organizations,6 as 
well as China’s success in restricting the online activity of its citizens.7  
These failures have done little to dampen the desire for a conceptual 
foundation for Internet self-governance. Interestingly, Internet guru 
Lawrence Lessig has suggested that more widespread use of open source 
software may increase the Internet’s ability to resist governmental con-
trol.8 This Article explores potential implications of that observation by 
examining whether more widespread use of open source software might 
provide the basis for the type of bottom-up ordering associated with the 
lex mercatoria. Part I offers an overview of open source software. Part II 
describes both the ancient and modern versions of the lex mercatoria and 
outlines some of the central debates about those institutions. Part III ex-
amines whether open source software can provide a decentralized 
mechanism for unifying the online commercial environment that is in-
dependent of national governments and international organizations in the 
manner that the proponents of the lex mercatoria envision. Perhaps un-
surprisingly, a system of self-governance based on open source runs 
afoul of the same questions of spontaneity, universality, and autonomy 
that surround the lex mercatoria. 
I. WHAT IS OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE? 
Open source software is one response to the growing importance and 
complexity of modern computer processing and networking.9 Computer 
programs generally exist in two forms. The first is known as “source 
code,” which is written in a programming language, such as C, Pascal, 
or Fortran. Although source code is quite technical, experienced pro-
grammers can read and modify it intelligibly. Source code is then com-
piled into “object code” or “machine language,” which is expressed as a 
                                                                                                                                       
5. See Christopher Rhoads, Red-Light District: Plan for Adult Area Sparks a Fight on Control 
of Web, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2006, at A1 (describing criticism of U.S. involvement in ICANN’s 
rejection of the .xxx domain). 
6. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 1041, 1063 (1996) (describing how private entities can influence standard setting processes). 
7. See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and 
the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 895–910 (2004) (describing “the Great Firewall of 
China”). 
8. See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 6–8, 20–21, 100–08. 
9. For an excellent overview of open source software, see Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing 
Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10–21 (2006). 
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series of 0s and 1s. Object code can be read by computers, but cannot 
easily be deciphered by human beings.  
Most software companies protect their work by only distributing their 
software in object code and by refusing to release the source code. In 
addition, software companies usually copyright the code that they dis-
tribute and include terms in the copyright licenses prohibiting customers 
from making any unauthorized copies or modifications. The absence of 
the source code and the contractual restrictions on modifying the code 
make it difficult for end users to diagnose and resolve incompatibility 
problems. Increases in the number and diversity of applications and pe-
ripheral devices run by end users, the growth in the number of connec-
tions between computers made possible by the Internet, and the greater 
integration of applications and network functions has made this problem 
all the more acute. 
The open source movement attempts to solve these problems in two 
ways. Open source software is copyrighted and then distributed under 
licenses—the most prominent of which is the GNU General Public Li-
cense (GPL)—that require that software be distributed with its source 
code or that the source code be made available on request for a period of 
three years. In addition, open source licenses leave follow-on developers 
free to use or modify the software as they see fit, provided that these 
modifications are clearly described and made available to others on an 
open source basis. In so doing, open source software embraces the vi-
sion that collective and cooperative efforts by multiple individuals rep-
resent the best approach for producing and improving code.10  
Open source licensing has proven to be quite effective in organizing 
the development of certain software. The leading success story of the 
open source movement is a nonproprietary operating system known as 
GNU/Linux, which began in the early 1980s when a change in computer 
hardware rendered obsolete an operating system that had been collec-
tively developed by the staff of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.11 A staff member named 
Richard Stallman chafed at the prospect of working on a computer with 
                                                                                                                                       
10. For the leading academic exposition of the merits of open source software, see YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 59–127 (2006). 
11. The description that follows is based in large part on Stallman’s own account of the ori-
gins of the open source movement. See Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the 
Free Software Movement, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 53 
(Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999), available at http://www.gnu.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html. 
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a proprietary operating system that he could not change. Instead, he re-
signed his position at MIT and began to lead the development of a Unix-
compatible operating system called GNU in January 1984. By 1990, 
Stallman and his associates had completed all of the major components 
of the operating system except the kernel, which is the part of the operat-
ing system that interfaces with the computer’s hardware. In 1992, a 
Norwegian student named Linus Torvalds released a Unix-like kernel he 
dubbed Linux and invited anyone to integrate it into an operating sys-
tem. Stallman combined Torvalds’s work with this own to form 
GNU/Linux, which has emerged as the leading alternative operating sys-
tem to Microsoft Windows. Stallman also founded the Free Software 
Foundation in 1985 to support the open source movement and to raise 
funds to support the development of GNU. Other prominent success sto-
ries include the Apache software, which is employed by most web serv-
ers, and the Firefox web browser by Mozilla, which has emerged as the 
leading competitor to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer web browser. 
II. WHAT IS LEX MERCATORIA? 
Although some trace the lex mercatoria back to Roman times, the 
conventional narrative begins in the Middle Ages, when trade fairs be-
gan to play an important role in the resurgence of international com-
merce.12 The itinerant merchants who traveled among these fairs grew 
increasingly frustrated with the nonuniformity of the laws that they con-
fronted as they traveled from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as well as the 
local judges’ lack of commercial sophistication. To address these con-
cerns, these traders spontaneously developed a uniform set of principles 
to resolve disputes among them. By mutual agreement, disputes between 
traders that arose under the law merchant would be resolved in special 
merchant courts run by the merchants themselves, which dealt with 
complex technical matters in a relatively informal and expedient man-
ner. These courts derived their authority not from the coercive power of 
the state, but rather from the fact that the contract specified that the mer-
chant courts would resolve any disputes between the parties. Traders 
who attempted to breach this agreement would find themselves ostra-
                                                                                                                                       
12. For overviews of the early history of the lex mercatoria, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW 
AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 332–56 (1982); LEON 
E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 7–21 (1983); Bruce 
L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644, 646–51 (1989). 
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cized by the other members of the merchant community. The content of 
these principles was independent of local law as well as other universal 
systems of rules like Roman Law, rediscovered and taught in European 
universities since the eleventh century, and Canon Law, the universal 
law of the Catholic Church.13 It was based instead on the prevailing cus-
toms and practices of the trade. As a result, the lex mercatoria reflected 
the collective wisdom of the entire trading community distilled from the 
bottom up in the manner envisioned by Friedrich Hayek,14 rather than 
being the conscious creation of any person or sovereign.  
Over time, nation states began to regard the independent, merchant-
centered authority provided by the lex mercatoria as a potential threat to 
their political power. Thus, during the course of the nineteenth century, 
the lex mercatoria was absorbed into national law. In civil law countries, 
the principles previously governed by the lex mercatoria were incorpo-
rated into commercial codes. In common law countries (particularly 
England), the view that the lex mercatoria was part of customary trans-
national business law and “not a law established by the sovereignty of 
any Prince”15 gave way as merchant courts were dissolved in favor of 
national common law courts. The attitude driving this shift of power 
away from the lex mercatoria is perhaps epitomized by the admonition 
that “[m]erchants ought to take their law from the courts and not the 
courts from the merchants; and when the law is found inconvenient for 
the purpose of extended commerce, application should be made to par-
liament for redress.”16 The progressive nationalization of the lex merca-
toria left it largely forgotten and reduced to a matter of legal history 
rather than an independent source of law. 
The modern resurgence of the lex mercatoria can be traced mainly to 
the 1960s.17 In an international symposium held in London in 1962 on 
                                                                                                                                       
13. See FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA (4th ed. 2001). 
14. See 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 8–34 (1973). 
15. GERARD MALYNES, CONSUETUDO VEL LEX MERCATORIA: OR THE ANCIENT LAW-
MERCHANT vi (photo. reprint 1997) (1622). 
16. Edward Christian, Note, 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *75 (Edward Christian ed., 14th ed. 1803) (1765), quoted in READINGS ON THE 
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 223 (Roscoe Pound & Theodore F.T. Plucknett 
eds., 3d ed. 1927). 
17. Before the 1960s, the lex mercatoria had been invoked by great comparative law scholars, 
such as Saleilles and Lambert, during the First International Congress of Comparative Law held in 
Paris in 1900. See H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 5–6, 18–19 (2d ed. 1949). Subse-
quently, international lawyers such as Fragistas and Goldstajn authored some articles on the 
emerging role of transnational law, both for arbitration procedure and for East-West trade during 
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the sources of contemporary law of international trade, Clive Schmit-
thoff argued that the practices of international trade might form a new 
lex mercatoria, observing: 
The evolution of an autonomous law of international trade, 
founded on universally accepted standards of business conduct, 
would be one of the most important developments of legal sci-
ence in our time. It would constitute a common platform for 
commercial lawyers from all countries, those of planned and free 
market economy, those from civil law and common law, and 
those of fully developed and developing economy, which would 
enable them to co-operate in the perfection of the legal mecha-
nism of international trade.18 
A seminal 1964 article by Berthold Goldman defined the scope of op-
eration of the new law merchant more clearly.19 As was the case during 
medieval times, this new law merchant was driven by the need for a uni-
form set of principles to govern international commercial transactions, 
as well as the desire for expeditious resolution of disputes. In its modern 
form, the lex mercatoria emerges from the terms of standard interna-
tional commercial contracts, professional codes of conduct, trade usages, 
general principles of law, and arbitral decisions.20 As proof of the exis-
                                                                                                                                       
the Cold War era. See Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place: 
A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, 2000 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 91, 93, re-
printed in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 3 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001). 
18. Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Law of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and Op-
eration, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3, 5 (Clive M. Schmitthoff ed., 
1964). 
19. Berthold Goldman, Frontiers du droit et “lex mercatoria,” in ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE 
DU DROIT 177 (1964) [hereinafter Goldman, Frontiers du droit]. For further development of 
Goldman’s approach, see Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et l’arbitrage 
internationaux: réalité et perspectives, 106 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 475 (1979) (Fr.); 
Berthold Goldman, La volonté des parties et le rôle de l’arbitre dans l’arbitrage international, 
1981 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 469 (Fr.); Berthold Goldman, The Applicable Law: General Prin-
ciples of Law—the Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 113 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1986) [hereinafter Goldman, Applicable Law]; Berthold 
Goldman, Nouvelles réflexions sur la lex mercatoria, in ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN 
L'HONNEUR DE PIERRE LALIVE 241 (Christian Dominicé et al. eds., 1993). Goldman’s views were 
notably extended by Philippe Kahn and Philippe Fouchard. See PHILIPPE KAHN, LA VENTE 
COMMERCIALE INTERNATIONALE 365–67 (1964); PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, L’ARBITRAGE 
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 465–546 (1965).  
20. See sources cited supra note 19; KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF 
THE LEX MERCATORIA (1999); FELIX DASSER, INTERNATIONALE SCHIEDSGERICHTE UND LEX 
MERCATORIA (1989); JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (1978); FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 
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tence of a new lex mercatoria, advocates point to references to the lex 
mercatoria in choice of law provisions in international commercial con-
tracts as well as the willingness of arbitrators to refer to the lex mercato-
ria when making arbitral awards.  
Recent studies have shown that such private lawmaking is condoned 
by the United States and many industrialized European countries 
through organizations such as the American Arbitration Association and 
in the securities sector through the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers,21 and banking clearing-houses.22 The same holds true for interna-
tional commodities merchants such as diamond dealers,23 grain mer-
chants,24 cotton merchants,25 and, of course, Internet services and 
domain providers.26 Law and economics research has confirmed that 
market-based sanctions may assure the enforcement of lex mercatoria 
outside of or in combination with state legal enforcement mechanisms.27 
                                                                                                                                       
(1992); FABRIZIO MARRELLA, LA NUOVA LEX MERCATORIA: PRINCIPI UNIDROIT ED USI DEI 
CONTRATTI DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE (2003).  
21. See George J. Benston, Regulation of Stock Trading: Private Exchanges vs. Government 
Agencies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1501 (1997); Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of 
Business and Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183 
(2000); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading 
Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999); David V. Snyder, Pri-
vate Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 384–88 (2003). 
22. See Snyder, supra note 21, at 395–99. 
23. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
24. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996). 
25. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
26. See Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. 
REV. 975 (2005); Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 
LA. L. REV. 1165 (2002); Clayton P. Gillette, Interpretation and Standardization in Electronic 
Sales Contracts, 53 SMU L. REV. 1431 (2000); Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Consti-
tutional Limitations on Privatization, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 481 (1998 Supp.); Bruce H. Kobayashi 
& Larry E. Ribstein, Uniformity, Choice of Law and Software Sales, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261 
(1999); A. Brooke Overby, Will Cyberlaw Be Uniform? An Introduction to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219 (1999); Margaret J. Radin & R. 
Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of 
Electronic Commerce, 51 EMORY L.J. 1 (2002). 
27. See Nerina Boschiero, La lex mercatoria nell’era della globalizzazione: considerazioni di 
diritto internazionale pubblico e privato, 2005 SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO 83 (Italy); Robert D. 
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 443 (1994); Robert D. 
Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 
 
2007] IS OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA? 815 
 
 
The new lex mercatoria’s most avid proponents describe it as a third 
system of law, independent of both national and public international law. 
Its essential characteristics are its spontaneity (in that it is created by de-
centralized private ordering, rather than by any particular nation, organi-
zation, or person), its universality, and its autonomy from legal systems 
(in that it does not depend on national or public international law for its 
existence or development). Others take a more limited view, regarding 
the lex mercatoria as providing a streamlined process for resolving dis-
putes28 or as a system for filling the gaps left by existing law.29 Since 
neither of these more limited visions of the lex mercatoria can serve as 
the basis for the type of bottom-up ordering envisioned for the Internet, 
we will focus on the broader vision. Other scholars have adopted an 
even more skeptical stance towards the lex mercatoria, challenging both 
its Roman and medieval roots30 as well as the existence of its modern 
revival.31  
                                                                                                                                       
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994); Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in 
Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181; (1996); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Govern-
mental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the 
Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (1997); Fabri-
zio Marrella, La nuova lex mercatoria tra controversie dogmatiche e mercato delle regole. Note di 
analisi economica del diritto dei contratti internazionali, 2005 SOCIOLOGIA DEL DIRITTO 249 
(Italy); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002); Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); 
Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681 (1996); James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096 
(1991). 
28. See William Jones, The Settlement of Mercantile Disputes by Merchants: An Approach to 
the History of Commercial Law, Address at the University of Chicago Law School Symposium: 
The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant (Oct. 16–17, 2003), cited in 
Mark D. Rosen, Do Codification and Private International Law Leave Room for a New Law Mer-
chant?, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 83, 85 n.9 (2004).  
29. See BERGER, supra note 20, at 40. 
30. See, e.g., J.H. Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295, 299–308 (1979); Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex 
Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21 (2004); Emily Kadens, 
Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 39 (2004); Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of 
the Medieval “Law Merchant”, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685 (2006); Oliver Volckart & Antje 
Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427 
(1999); Albrecht Cordes, The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 2003 OXFORD U. COMP. 
L.F. 5, http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/cordes.shtml. 
31. See, e.g., Georges R. Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Con-
tracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 575 (1989); Keith Highet, The Enigma of 
the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613 (1989); Christoph W.O. Stoecker, The Enigma of the 
Lex Mercatoria: To What Extent Does it Exist?, J. INT’L ARB., Mar. 1990, at 101, 109–10. As one 
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Today, choice of law clauses permit harmonization of international 
commercial law by specifying that the substantive legal rules used to re-
solve the dispute may encompass, via the lex mercatoria, general princi-
ples of law and the customs and practices of international trade rather 
than the substantive contract law of any particular state.32 Although na-
tional courts once subjected foreign law to fairly intensive review to en-
sure its consistency with the public policy embedded in local law, over 
time most nations’ courts have become increasingly willing to honor the 
contracting parties requests to apply foreign law or even a law of their 
own devising.33 Honoring the contracting parties’ choice of law provi-
sions obviates the need to resolve the vexing choice of law issues that 
often plague disputes over international transactions. In so doing, it pro-
vides the uniformity upon which international trade depends. 
In addition, most international commercial contracts include a clause 
                                                                                                                                       
commentator notes, “The modern lex mercatoria is unlike any other field of law. People never tire 
of asking whether it exists.” Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria—Hoist with Its Own Pe-
tard?, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 67, 67 (2004). 
32. The most recent evaluation of U.S. law concludes that U.S. law will permit parties to agree 
that arbitrations will be governed by non-state norms, such as the lex mercatoria. Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Contracts Subject to Non-State Norms, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 210–15 (2006) (U.S. 
National Report to the 17th International Congress of Comparative Law), available at 
http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/PDF%20files/IIB1/IIB1%20-%20USA.pdf. International arbi-
tration regulation rules provide a legal basis for a choice of the lex mercatoria. For example, the 
arbitration rules of the London Court of International Arbitration permit the parties to agree that 
the arbitration be governed by law other than that of the seat of arbitration. See LONDON COURT 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 16.3 (1998), available at http://www.lcia.org/ 
ARB_folder/ARB_DOWNLOADS/ENGLISH/rules.pdf. The arbitration rules of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the International Institute for Confliction Prevention and Resolution 
Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration (formerly the Center for Public Resources Institute for 
Dispute Resolution), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization provide that the tribunal shall apply the rules of law agreed upon by the parties or, in 
the absence of such an agreement, the law that the tribunal “determines to be appropriate.” See 
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 17.1 (1998), available at http:// 
www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp; INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & 
RESOLUTION, RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION R. 10.1, available at http://www. 
cpradr.org/pdfs/arb-rules2005.pdf; ARBITRATION RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE 
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE art. 22.1 (2007), available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/ 
_upload/shared_files/regler/new_scc_rules_070101.pdf; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG. 
ARB. & MEDIATION CTR., WIPO ARBITRATION RULES art. 59(a) (1994), available at http://www. 
wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/index.html. 
33. See Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and 
the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1227–37 (2005) (arguing 
that under modern conflict of law principles, courts refuse to apply non-state law like the lex mer-
catoria as law, but will enforce arbitrations based on non-state law and will use a variety of other 
devices to acknowledge non-state normative orders); Symeonides, supra note 32, at 212. 
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specifying that any disputes arising from the contract will be resolved 
through commercial arbitration. Shifting disputes to an arbitral forum 
has provided for expedited resolution and inoculated the parties from 
anti-foreign biases.34 Although reliance on arbitration may make the new 
lex mercatoria somewhat dependent on national law, any such depend-
ence is relatively thin. While courts were once quite protective of their 
own jurisdiction and somewhat reluctant to enforce arbitral judgments 
based on laws that conflicted with the public policy of national law, 
most systems are now willing to compel arbitration in accordance with 
arbitration clauses and construe the public policy exception to the en-
forcement of arbitral judgments based on foreign law rather narrowly.35 
As a result, arbitration clauses have proven quite effective in freeing 
disputes from the application of norms by national courts, allowing 
commercial expertise to bear on these norms instead. 
The new lex mercatoria has been fostered by recent attempts to distill 
a set of model rules to govern international commercial transactions, in-
cluding the Principles of International Commercial Contracts produced 
by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT),36 and on a different scale the Principles of European Con-
tract Law,37 as well as by scholarly attempts to synthesize the lex merca-
toria into a set of core legal principles.38 Arbitrators have evinced an in-
                                                                                                                                       
34. Among a vast literature see Bruno Oppetit, Philosophie de l'arbitrage commercial interna-
tional, 120 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 811 (1993) (Fr.); Andreas Lowenfeld, Lex Mer-
catoria: An Arbitrator’s View, 6 ARB. INT’L 133 (1990), reprinted in LEX MERCATORIA AND 
ARBITRATION 37 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998); ANDREAS LOWENFELD, 
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2006).  
35. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Ar-
bitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 725 (1999) (noting that “courts rarely vacate arbitration awards 
on public policy grounds”) (citing 4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.8, 
at 40:96–:104 (1994)). 
36. INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2004), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/ 
principles/contracts/main.htm. 
37. 1 & 2 COMM’N ON EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 
(Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.        
principles.1998/doc.html; 3 COMM’N ON EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW (Ole Lando et al. eds., 2003), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract. 
principles.parts.1.to.3.2002. 
38. See Tom Carbonneau, A Definition of and Perspective Upon the Lex Mercatoria Debate, 
in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 34, at 11, 16–20; Goldman, Applicable Law, 
supra note 19, at 123–25; Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First 
Twenty-five Years, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE 149, 174–77 
(Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987); Note, General Principles of Law in International 
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creasing willingness to apply the lex mercatoria and UNIDROIT when 
the choice of law provision of an international contract specifically in-
vokes them, when determining the relevant principle of national law is 
difficult or impossible to determine, and when filing gaps in interna-
tional conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).39  
The lex mercatoria and the UNIDROIT Principles have begun to in-
fluence European policymakers outside the context of arbitration and in-
ternational contracts as well. Choice of law issues in Europe are cur-
rently governed by the Convention on the Applicable Law to 
Contractual Obligations (commonly known as the 1980 Rome Conven-
tion).40 Article 4 of the Rome Convention provides that in the absence of 
a choice of law clause, disputes will be “governed by the law of the 
country with which [the contract] is most closely connected,” which is 
presumed to be the country of the party who is to effect the performance 
unless “it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is 
more closely connected with another country.”41 Presently, the European 
Community is considering replacing the 1980 Rome Convention with a 
new regulation. Article 3 of the proposed EC regulation provides that “a 
contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties”42 and spe-
cifically recognizes the possible application of nonnational law by pro-
viding: 
The parties may also choose as the applicable law the principles 
and rules of the substantive law of contract recognised interna-
tionally or in the Community. However, questions relating to 
matters governed by such principles or rules which are not ex-
pressly settled by them shall be governed by the general princi-
ples underlying them or, failing such principles, in accordance 
                                                                                                                                       
Commercial Arbitration, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1826–33 (1988); Transnational Law Digest & 
Bibliography, http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/ (last visted Aug. 1, 2007). 
39. See generally Fabrizio Marrella, Choice of Law in Third Millennium Arbitrations: The 
Relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1137, 1158–77 (2003). Further references are available in the UNILEX database. 
UNILEX on CISG & UNIDROIT Principles, http://www.unilex.info/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2007). 
40. Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980, 1980 
O.J. (L 266) 1, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/ec.applicable.law.contracts.1980/doc.html. 
41. Id. art. 4, paras. 1, 5. 
42. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), at 14, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 15, 
2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0650en01. 
pdf. 
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with the law applicable in the absence of a choice under this 
Regulation.43  
The commentary on the proposed regulation makes clear that this 
language “authorises the parties to choose as the applicable law a non-
State body of law,” including “the UNIDROIT principles, the Principles 
of European Contract Law or a possible future optional Community in-
strument.”44 Whether it would authorize a choice of law provision in-
voking the lex mercatoria directly would depend on whether the lex 
mercatoria constituted a body of contract law “recognised internationally 
or in the Community.”45 Furthermore, the commentary explicitly sug-
gests that the provision would exclude a choice of law provision based 
on the lex mercatoria on the grounds that it is insufficiently precise. The 
interpretation of the provision offered by the commentary is somewhat 
self-contradictory, since it may be argued that even the UNIDROIT 
Principles are not, technically speaking, “recognised internationally.” 
Some scholars have pointed out that the UNIDROIT Principles are an 
academic exercise.46 Thus, in contrast to the work of the United Nations 
International Law Commission,47 the UNIDROIT Principles are the re-
sult of the efforts of eminent lawyers and law professors. In this sense, 
the UNIDROIT Principles are similar to a Restatement produced by the 
American Law Institute, but on a global scale.48 Hence, the UNIDROIT 
                                                                                                                                       
43. Id.  
44. Id. at 5.  
45. Id. at 14. 
46. See Andrea Giardina, Les principes UNIDROIT sur les contrats internationaux, 3 
JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 547 (1995) (Fr.); Catherine Kessedjian, Un exercice de ré-
novation des sources du droit des contrats du commerce international: Les Principes proposés 
par l’UNIDROIT, 4 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 641 (1995) (Fr.). 
47. According to the U.N. General Assembly statute that created the International Law Com-
mission, the Commission’s object is the “progressive development of international law.” Statute 
of the International Law Commission art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf. The statute further pro-
vides: 
[T]he expression “progressive development of international law” is used for convenience 
as meaning the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been 
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently 
developed in the practice of States. Similarly, the expression “codification of interna-
tional law” is used for convenience as meaning the more precise formulation and sys-
tematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been extensive 
State practice, precedent and doctrine. 
Id. art. 15. 
48. See MICHAEL J. BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW (2d ed. 
2005). 
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Principles derive their legitimacy from the bottom up rather than from 
the top down. 
III. CAN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE SERVE AS A NEW LEX 
MERCATORIA FOR THE INTERNET? 
The debates around the lex mercatoria provide a framework for 
evaluating whether open source software can serve as the foundation for 
the type of bottom-up ordering envisioned by many Internet scholars. 
We focus on three aspects often said to be essential to the lex mercato-
ria: spontaneity, universality, and autonomy from national law. 
A. Spontaneity 
The lex mercatoria is often described as being “spontaneous,” in that 
it emerges from the practices of merchants without any exercise of gov-
ernmental power, intergovernmental lawmaking process, or ratifica-
tion.49 Indeed, spontaneity is often described as one of the lex mercato-
ria’s defining characteristics.50 Although some scholars argue that 
spontaneity also requires that the lex mercatoria not be fashioned as an 
instrument of harmonization,51 others claim that attempts to harmonize 
international commercial law may still be part of the lex mercatoria so 
long as they do not rely on an exercise of sovereign power by the con-
stituent states.52 
Serious questions exist whether open source software satisfies the lex 
mercatoria’s definition of spontaneity. Although the institution of open 
                                                                                                                                       
49. In the words of Lord Justice Mustill, “The lex mercatoria simply exists. It springs up 
spontaneously, in the soil of international trade. It is a growth, not a creation.” Mustill, supra note 
38, at 153. For other examples of defining the lex mercatoria in terms of spontaneity, see Bernard 
Audit, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND 
ARBITRATION, supra note 34, at 173, 173; and Goldman, Applicable Law, supra note 19, at 114.  
50. See R.J. Dupuy, Legal Opinion to Aminoil para. 26, Kuwait v. Aminoil, 21 I.L.M. 976 
(1982) (calling the lex mercatoria “a phenomenon whose principal characteristic is that it is spon-
taneous”), quoted in Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: 
A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 657, 666 
(1999); Roy Goode, Rule, Practice, and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial Law, 54 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 539, 548 (2005) (noting that “the process of spontaneous lawmaking…is said to be 
the hallmark of the lex mercatoria”); Maniruzzaman, supra, at 666–67 (calling spontaneity “the 
principal basis of selection of rules for the lex mercatoria”).  
51. See Fassberg, supra note 31, at 80–81; Mustill, supra note 38, at 152–53; Rosen, supra 
note 28, at 89. 
52. See Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, FORUM INTERNATIONALE, Nov. 1983, at 1, 7. 
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source software is the result of individual licensing decisions, the con-
tent of those licenses is more the reflection of the will of strong norm en-
trepreneurs who wish to shape the values of the online community rather 
than the emergence of customs established through decentralized deci-
sionmaking. Of particular significance are the efforts of Richard 
Stallman, who, as noted earlier, led the development of GNU/Linux op-
erating system into the first significant open source project and wrote 
both the initial and subsequent versions of the GPL.53 Stallman has made 
clear that he regards the open source movement as a “stark moral 
choice” and has made it a personal goal to inculcate new users with the 
open source philosophy.54 Another organization known as the Open 
Source Initiative, which is the current certifying body for open source 
licenses, was also created not to reflect industry customs and norms, but 
rather to transform them self-consciously through a media campaign de-
signed to work from the top down rather than the bottom up.55 
The centralized nature of open source norm creation makes it hard to 
characterize the open source movement as the result of spontaneous, 
bottom-up, decentralized decisionmaking. Instead, open source princi-
ples are more properly regarded as a reflection of the views espoused by 
leading open source advocates.  
B. Universality 
As Harold Berman notes, “The universal character of the law mer-
chant…has been stressed by all who have written about it.”56 The com-
monness across countries represent a major part of the lex mercatoria’s 
utility. On a more fundamental level, however, many advocates of the 
lex mercatoria believe that this universality is based on the existence of a 
common core of legal rules that are so “[u]niversally acknowledged” as 
to constitute “natural-law-type principles.”57  
Others have challenged the universality of the lex mercatoria. Some 
point to the enduring disputes over the content of the lex mercatoria, ar-
                                                                                                                                       
53. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
54. Stallman, supra note 11, at 55–63, 67–70. 
55. See Eric S. Raymond, The Revenge of the Hackers, in OPEN SOURCES, supra note 11, at 
207, 211–16. 
56. BERMAN, supra note 12, at 342. For other statements defining the lex mercatoria in terms 
of “universality,” see Goldman, Frontiers du droit, supra note 19, at 183; Mustill, supra note 38, 
at 157; and GALGANO, supra note 13. 
57. Carbonneau, supra note 38, at 16. 
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guing that the resulting principles are so vague and general as to provide 
little real guidance or constraint.58 Others argue that the lex mercatoria 
disproportionately reflects the views of industrialized western nations.59  
Still others take a more contextual view of universality, drawing a 
distinction between “macro” lex mercatoria, which are the legal princi-
ples common to all or most of the nations engaged in international trade, 
and “micro” lex mercatoria, which means the legal principles generated 
by a particular contract.60 From this perspective, the lex mercatoria need 
not be truly universal so long as it is uniform with respect to the legal 
systems connected with the dispute.61 Others regard the lex mercatoria 
not as a single, unified body of law, but rather sets of laws that vary 
from industry to industry in the form of a separate “lex petrolea,” “lex 
constructionis,” “lex electronica,” and “lex maritima.”62 Moreover, even 
if the substance is uniform, the application to particular facts requires in-
terpretation. In the process, interpreters necessarily bring in their own 
culture by the way they frame the issues and how they interpret.63 
Open source has not achieved the type of universality or uniformity of 
principles envisioned by proponents of the lex mercatoria. The lack of 
unifying principles is exemplified by the proliferation of types of open 
source licenses. As of this writing, the Open Source Initiative has ap-
                                                                                                                                       
58. See Cordes, supra note 30; Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de la lex mercatoria, in LE 
DROIT DES RELATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES: ÉTUDES OFFERTES À BERTHOLD 
GOLDMAN 125 (1982); Peter M. Flanagan, Demythologising the Law Merchant: The Impropriety 
of the Lex Mercatoria as a Choice of Law, 15 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 297, 300–01 
(2004). 
59. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 50, at 691, 718; Sampson L. Sempasa, Obstacles To Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration in African Countries, 41 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 387, 410 (1992); 
M. Sornarajah, The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World Viewpoint, J. INT’L ARB., Dec. 1989, 
7, 17, 20. See generally DE LY, supra note 20, at 208–48. 
60. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 50, at 691 & n.151.  
61. See Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 747, 750 (1985). 
62. See Doak R. Bishop, International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of 
a Lex Petrolea, 23 Y.B. COM. ARB. 1131 (1998); Michael Douglas, The Lex Mercatoria and the 
Culture of Transnational Industry, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 367, 394–95 (2006); 
Vincent Gautrais et al., Droit du Commerce Electronique et Norme Applicable: L’Emergence de 
la Lex Electronica, 5 REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRS INTERNATIONALES 547 (1997) (Fr.); 
Maniruzzaman, supra note 50, at 667–68; Fabrizio Marrella, Unity and Diversity in International 
Arbitration: The Case of Maritime Arbitration, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1055 (2005); Charles 
Molineaux, Moving Toward a Construction Lex Mercatoria: A Lex Constructionis, J. INT’L ARB., 
Mar. 1997, at 55, 59–61; William Tetley, The General Maritime Law—The Lex Maritima (with a 
Brief Reference to the Ius Commune in Arbitration Law and the Conflict of Laws), 20 SYRACUSE 
J. INT’L L. & COM. 105 (1994). 
63. See Douglas, supra note 62, at 383.  
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proved fifty-eight different open source licenses.64 A brief discussion of 
two of the most common open source licenses illustrates the point. The 
licensing restrictions contained in the GPL apply not only to the original 
code covered by the GPL, but also to any modifications that cannot rea-
sonably be considered independent and separate works. These provi-
sions cause these licenses to sometimes be described as “reciprocal,” in 
that any developer who wishes to take advantage of open access to an 
existing piece of GPL code must contribute any improvements they 
make back to the open source community.65 They are also described as 
“viral,” because any proprietary code that becomes integrated with code 
licensed under the GPL becomes subject to the open source mandate.66 
“Academic” licenses, like the Berkeley Software Distribution (“BSD”) 
license, are quite different in that they do not require that modifications 
be made freely available to others. Instead, the BSD only requires that 
any modification provide clear notice of the changes and give appropri-
ate credit to the creators of the original code.67 The effect is to allow 
open source software distributed under a BSD license to be freely com-
bined with proprietary software without any concern. 
The differences between reciprocal and academic licenses reflect the 
plurality of norms underlying the open source movement. Reciprocal li-
censes reflect a distaste for the commercialization of software and a re-
luctance to allow those driven by profit to use open source software to 
their own commercial advantage. Academic licenses do not share this 
hostility and instead reflect a belief that work prepared solely for aca-
demic purposes should be freely available to everyone with no strings 
attached. The underlying heterogeneity of norms and practices thus un-
dercuts any assertions that open source software provides the type of 
universality associated with the lex mercatoria. 
C. Autonomy 
Finally, the lex mercatoria is typically described as being “autono-
mous,” in that its development is said to be independent from both na-
                                                                                                                                       
64. See Open Source Initiative, The Approved Licenses, http://www.opensource.org/licenses 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2007). 
65. See Mann, supra note 9, at 16–17.  
66. See Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. 
REV. 563, 633–34. 
67. See Mann, supra note 9, at 17–18. 
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tional and international law.68 One should be careful not to make too 
much of this claim. Complete separation of legal systems is an abstract 
dogma which does not correspond to reality. In this respect, even (pub-
lic) international law is not completely separate from national legal sys-
tems. This does not, of course, imply that international law is not “law” 
in a technical sense.69 Rather the claim of autonomy means that private 
business actors can produce law (even if it is not “national law”) without 
a previous authorization by nation states. In this sense, lex mercatoria 
may exist and be applied without a “rule of recognition” emanating by 
nation states.70 
From this perspective, it is no surprise that lex mercatoria may de-
pend upon national law to recognize arbitral jurisdiction and to enforce 
arbitral judgments.71 The dependence of the lex mercatoria on national 
law is relatively thin. All that is required of national law is that it enforce 
arbitration clauses by compelling arbitration and recognize and enforce 
arbitral decisions once they have been handed down. Although the 
courts of many countries were once quite aggressive in declining to con-
done arbitration under legal principles that conflicted with the public 
policy of national law, over time they have exhibited a greater willing-
ness to apply foreign law and the lex mercatoria.72 
Open source software is much more dependent on national law than 
are transactions governed by the lex mercatoria. Open source licenses 
typically make no provision for arbitration of disputes. As a result, en-
forcement of the copyright license and substantive copyright law is left 
to national courts and the choice of law rules embodied in national law. 
Furthermore, the substance of the copyright and patent law of individual 
                                                                                                                                       
68. See Goldman, supra note 52, at 22; Lando, supra note 61, at 752; Mustill, supra note 38, 
at 151 (describing the lex mercatoria as “anational”). 
69. See Alain Pellet, La lex mercatoria, “tiers ordre juridique”? Remarques ingénues d’un in-
ternationaliste de droit public, in SOUVERAINETE ETATIQUE ET MARCHES INTERNATIONAUX A LA 
FIN DU 20EME SIECLE : A PROPOS DE 30 ANS DE RECHERCHE DU CREDIMI : MELANGES EN 
L’HONNEUR DE PHILIPPE KAHN 53 (2000). 
70. The argument is adequately developed by Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina, in GLOBAL 
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). The classic work on the rule of recogni-
tion is, of course, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97–150 (1961). 
71. See GEORGES R. DELAUME, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 99 
(1988) (recognizing that “the ‘delocalization’ of transnational contracts in never complete”); Wil-
liam W. Park, Control Mechanisms in the Development of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX 
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION, supra note 34, at 143, 152; Highet, supra note 31, at 614–15; 
Hans Smit, Proper Choice of Law and the Lex Mercatoria Arbitralis, in LEX MERCATORIA AND 
ARBITRATION, supra note 34, at 93, 108. 
72. See supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text. 
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nations exert considerable influence over open source software as well.  
1. Copyright 
Authors of open source software could have ensured open access to 
their work simply by renouncing copyright protection and dedicating 
their code to the public domain. Open source advocates chose not to fol-
low this approach primarily out of concern that follow-on developers 
who made derivative works based on open source code would frustrate 
the purposes of the open source movement by copyrighting their im-
provements. In order to prevent this, the basic approach of the GPL is to 
copyright software and then license it to everyone under the condition 
that every licensee agrees to distribute freely any improvements or 
modifications they may make. 
The result is that the scope of rights under open source licenses de-
pends on copyright law. The primary international copyright treaties, 
such as the Berne Convention and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), as well as efforts at regional copyright harmonization 
through forums such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the European Union, and the Andean Pact have all declined 
to establish an international copyright law. They instead established 
minimum levels of protection that leave countries free to add additional 
protection as they see fit. The resulting variations in the scope of copy-
right protection leave open source software dependent on national law.  
A few examples will illustrate the point. Consider, first, the difficult 
issues surrounding moral rights. The copyright law of many European 
nations gives strong protection to moral rights, including the rights of 
disclosure, withdrawal, attribution, and integrity. These rights are often 
nonwaivable and thus cannot be dissipated via a license. As a result, 
programmers who modify code may retain rights in the code they pro-
duce regardless of the specific terms of the open source license.73 U.S. 
law, in contrast, offers minimal protection of moral rights and restricts 
those to the visual arts.74 These differences mean that the success of the 
open source’s movement strategy of copyrighting software and then in-
cluding license terms requiring that all modifications be shared necessar-
ily depends on the details of national law. 
                                                                                                                                       
73. See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author 
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347 (1993). 
74. See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). 
826 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 47:4 
 
 
Consider also the clause of the GPL license requiring that all deriva-
tive works be distributed on the same terms as the GPL.75 There is rea-
son to question the validity of this provision under U.S. law, which has 
traditionally been somewhat hostile towards attempts to use market 
power provided by intellectual property to control the disposition of fol-
low-on innovation.76 In particular, the GPL provisions on licensing fol-
low-on innovations resemble provisions in patent licenses commonly 
known as “grantbacks.” More modest grantback provisions simply re-
quire patent licensees to give the licensor a nonexclusive license to any 
improvements based on the licensed patent. More restrictive grantback 
provisions require the licensee to assign any patents to follow-on im-
provements back to the licensor outright. The Supreme Court recognized 
that although licenses requiring licensees to assign patents on any im-
provement back to the patent holder are not illegal per se, circumstances 
exist under which they can violate the antitrust laws.77 Some lower fed-
eral courts have carried the Supreme Court’s reasoning to its logical 
conclusion and held that certain grantback provisions constituted anti-
trust violations,78 and during the 1970s the Justice Department listed 
grantback provisions among the nine licensing practices that it consid-
ered to be illegal per se.79  
In addition, the Supreme Court has long employed a doctrine known 
as patent misuse to invalidate patent holders’ attempts to extend their 
patents beyond their proper scope.80 Patent misuse encompasses, but is 
                                                                                                                                       
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
76. Some early judicial decisions suggested that any license term that imposed restrictions that 
exceeded those imposed by copyright law were preempted. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Soft-
ware Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). The trend of more recent decisions is to hold that 
copyright law does not preempt such licensing agreements. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 
Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying First Circuit law); ProCD, Inc. v. Zei-
denberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453–55 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. 
Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431–34 (8th Cir. 1993). 
77. See Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
78. See United States v. Associated Patents, Inc. 134 F. Supp. 74, 82 (E.D. Mich. 1955), aff’d 
mem. sub nom. Mac Inv. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 960 (1956); United States v. Besser Mfg. 
Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); United States v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1005–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 63 F. 
Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff’d, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
79. See Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Remarks Be-
fore the Annual Joint Meeting of the Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section and the Patent 
Trademark and Copyright Law Section (Sept. 21, 1972), excerpted in [1969–1983 Current Com-
ment Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50,146, at 55,248 (Oct. 9, 1972). 
80. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (“[T]he 
Court has condemned attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent monop-
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not necessarily limited to, all attempts to extend the market power pro-
vided by a patent beyond the terms of the patent grant that violate the 
antitrust laws81 and renders the patent unenforceable until the misuse is 
purged.82 Some courts have held that grantback provisions constitute 
patent misuse, because they represented an attempt by the patent holder 
to control innovations that fell outside of the patent’s scope.83  
Over time, antitrust law has become more accommodating toward 
grantback provisions. The Justice Department began to take a more hos-
pitable stance towards grantback clauses during the 1980s, adopting a 
“rule of reason” approach that permits grantback provisions absent a 
showing of actual anticompetitive effect.84 A 1988 statutory amendment 
explicitly provided that grantback provisions only constitute patent mis-
use if the patent holder possesses market power.85 Furthermore, the cur-
rent Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property rec-
ognize that grantback provisions “can have procompetitive effects, 
especially if they are nonexclusive” and “may be necessary to ensure 
that the licensor is not prevented from effectively competing because it 
is denied access to improvements developed with the aid of its own 
technology.”86 Accordingly, the Guidelines clearly provide that grant-
back clauses will be evaluated under the rule of reason, focusing on 
“whether the licensor possesses market power in a relevant technology 
or innovation market,” whether the grantback provision “is likely to re-
duce significantly licensees’ incentives to invest in improving the li-
                                                                                                                                       
oly.”); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492–93 (1942) (offering the seminal 
discussion of patent misuse). 
81. Interestingly, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are split over whether patent misuse requires 
proof of a completed antitrust violation. Compare, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 
505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that conduct must rise to the level of an antitrust violation to 
constitute patent misuse), with C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (concluding that “[p]atent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust violation” and 
that “misuse may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not met”). 
82. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Morton Salt, 314 
U.S. at 493; Unitherm Food Sys., Inc, v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
83. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 671–72, 700 (D.S.C. 1977) 
(holding that mandatory assignment of improvements did not violate antitrust laws, but did consti-
tute patent misuse), aff’d, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979). 
84. See Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in 
the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 261–62 (1991). 
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000). 
86. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.6, at 30 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
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censed technology,” and “the extent to which the grantback provision 
has offsetting procompetitive effects.”87 
Similar issues arise with respect to copyright. In 1990, a U.S. Court of 
Appeals drew an analogy to patent misuse doctrine to recognize a paral-
lel doctrine of copyright misuse.88 Although courts have yet to address 
the issue, commentators have suggested that grantback clauses could 
constitute copyright misuse.89 Indeed, IBM appears to have so argued in 
the process of defending a copyright infringement suit brought by Unix-
owner SCO.90 The Guidelines also make clear that nonexclusive grant-
backs, like those in open source licenses, are less likely to have anti-
competitive effects.91 In addition, with respect to copyright, attempts to 
control derivative works may not be properly regarded as an attempt to 
expand the scope of copyright protection. In contrast to U.S. patent law, 
under which follow-on innovations are independently patentable, U.S. 
copyright law does not grant follow-on innovators independent protec-
tion and instead regards any unauthorized derivative works as infringe-
ment.92 As a result, grantback terms may be less likely to be regarded as 
attempts to extend the scope of copyright protection beyond the statutory 
grant.93 Conversely, the fact that follow-on innovations receive no pro-
tection under copyright law arguably undercuts any suggestion that this 
provision is necessary to preserve the licensor’s ability to compete. 
The viral aspects of the open source license raise far greater concerns. 
To the extent that the licensing provision attempts to exert control over 
                                                                                                                                       
87. Id. 
88. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). On the history of 
copyright misuse, see Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual 
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 151–58 (1999). As is the case with patent misuse, the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals are split over whether conduct that does not rise to the level of an antirust 
violation can constitute copyright misuse. Compare, e.g., Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumble-
seat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that conduct must rise to a level of 
an antitrust violation to constitute copyright misuse), with Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978 (taking the 
position “a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law”). 
89. See Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 349, 369 (2002); Ian N. Feinberg, Antitrust Issues in Intellectual Property Licensing Agree-
ments, 845 PRACTISING LAW INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 661, 707; Kevin J. O’Connor, A Primer on Vertical Restraint Law 
Applied to Intellectual Property—Is Microsoft Really a Vertical Restraints Case?, A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Mar. 17, 2005, at 7, available at http://www.gklaw.com/docs/      
publications/375.pdf. 
90. See Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 34. 
91. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 86, § 5.6, at 30.  
92. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1173–74 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
93. See Feinberg, supra note 89, at 707. 
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unrelated and preexisting intellectual property that are not derivative 
improvements of the open source software, it may be struck down under 
copyright misuse as an impermissible attempt to exercise rights beyond 
those granted by copyright. If so, the copyright would be unenforceable 
until the misuse is purged, and follow-on innovators would be free to 
commercialize open source code.94 At the same time, the Antitrust 
Guidelines also make clear that nonexclusive grantbacks, like those in 
open source licenses, are less likely to have anticompetitive effects.95 
Thus, one can see that certain aspects of open source licenses are poten-
tially suspect under U.S. copyright law. 
European law has no direct analogue to the copyright misuse doctrine. 
Although civil law recognizes a similar sounding doctrine known as 
“abuse of right,” this doctrine is reserved for extreme situations and is 
not commonly used to correct the alleged unfairness of contractual 
agreements.96 European Union law has adopted an increasingly permis-
sive stance toward requirements that licensees assign or license back 
rights to any follow-on improvements.97 The EC Treaty permits the 
European Commission to exempt conduct from antitrust-style scrutiny 
either on a case-by-case basis or through categorical “block exemp-
tions.” 98 In 1996, the EC adopted the Technology Transfer Block Ex-
emption (TTBE) regulation to cover certain IP licensing practices. Most 
importantly for our purposes, the 1996 TTBE did not exempt license 
terms requiring the licensee to assign back to the licensor rights to any 
improvements or new applications based on the licensed technology.99 
The inclusion of an assign-back term placed the entire licensing agree-
ment outside the scope of the exemption provided by the TTBE. The 
                                                                                                                                       
94. See Nadan, supra note 89, at 369–70. 
95. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 86, at 30. 
96. See Jacques De Werra, Moving Beyond the Conflict Between Freedom of Contract and 
Copyright Policies: In Search of a New Global Policy for On-Line Information Licensing Trans-
actions, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 239, 338–39 (2003). 
97. See generally Fiona Carlin & Stephanie Pautke, The Last of Its Kind: The Review of the 
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 601 (2004).  
98. The principal provision covering agreements that restrict competition under the original 
EC Treaty was Article 85. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 85, 
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47–48. The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered this provi-
sion Article 81. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 
81, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173, 208–09, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/ 
lex/en/treaties/dat/11997E/htm/11997E.html#0173010078. 
99. Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 3, para. 6, 1990 O.J. (L31) 2, 9 (EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996R0240:EN:HTML. 
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1996 TTBE did exempt provisions that required the licensee to license 
any improvements back to the licensor provided that (1) in the case of 
severable improvements the license was nonexclusive and (2) the licen-
sor grants an exclusive or non-exclusive license to his own improve-
ments to the licensee.100  
Over time, the EC began to recognize that its formalistic, categorical 
approach failed to take into account whether the licensor possessed mar-
ket power or whether the agreement was likely to have any anticompeti-
tive effects. As a result, the 1996 TTBE was discouraging a great deal of 
IP licensing that would have enhanced competition and economic effi-
ciency. These concerns led the EC to adopt a new TTBE in 2004 that 
imposed market share thresholds that must be met before certain licens-
ing practices would be subject to Article 81.101 Like the 1996 TTBE, the 
new TTBE mandates that provisions which require the licensee to assign 
back or grant exclusive licenses to any improvements are not exempt 
from Article 81.102 In other ways, the new TTBE took a more permissive 
approach toward grantbacks on improvements.103 For example, provi-
sions requiring nonexclusive licenses to any improvements need no 
longer be reciprocal to remain legal.104 Even more importantly, under 
the 1996 TTBE, the inclusion of an overly restrictive grantback or as-
sign-back term took the entire licensing agreement outside the scope of 
the TTBE and thus subjected the entire agreement to Article 81. Under 
the current TTBE, the inclusion of such terms only renders those terms 
nonexempt without affecting the validity of the remainder of the agree-
ment.105In short, U.S. law is likely to subject the viral licensing provi-
sions to the rule of reason, while reciprocal and nonexclusive grantback 
provisions such as those generally contained in open source licenses are 
likely to be exempt from antitrust-style scrutiny under either the 1996 or 
the 2004 TTBEs. The enforceability of open source licenses may thus 
                                                                                                                                       
100. Id. art. 2, para. 1(4), at 7. 
101. Commission Regulation 772/2004, art. 3, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11, 14 (EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_123/l_12320040427en00110017.pdf. 
102. Id. art. 5, para. 1(a)-(b), at 16. 
103. See Makan Delrahim, The Long and Winding Road: Convergence in the Application of 
Antitrust to Intellectual Property, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 259, 262 n.10 (2005) (noting that “the 
revised TTBE is much more tolerant of once black-listed restraints, such as exclusive grantbacks 
on improvements”). 
104. See Carlin & Pautke, supra note 97, at 616. 
105. See id.; Isabel Davies & Nick Bolter, Trade Mark Licenses and the Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 899, 907 (2004). 
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vary with the particular national law most closely associated with a par-
ticular piece of software. This conclusion effectively raises serious 
doubts about claims that open source licensing can constitute an 
autonomous enforcement regime that is independent of national or inter-
national law.  
2. Patent 
National variations in patent law represent an even more significant 
potential restriction on open source software. As was the case with copy-
right, the leading international patent treaties, such as the Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement, each sim-
ply set forth minimum levels of patent protection, while leaving individ-
ual nations free to provide additional protection as they saw fit. One par-
ticular area of international divergence was with respect to software 
patents, which receive different treatment in different areas of the world. 
After exhibiting considerable resistance to permitting the patenting of 
software,106 U.S. law eventually adopted a more sympathetic stance to-
ward software patents107 and eventually began to regard software as pat-
entable subject matter.108  
European nations have adopted a more skeptical stance towards soft-
ware patents. The European Patent Convention, which despite its name 
is not an act of the European Union but rather a multilateral treaty, has 
long taken the position that software is not patentable,109 and on July 6, 
2005, the European Parliament overwhelming rejected a European 
Commission proposal that would have authorized software patents.110 
Notwithstanding this rejection, the European Patent Office and national 
patent offices of EU member states have construed the limitation nar-
rowly, issuing thousands of patents on the grounds that, while European 
law prohibits the patenting of naked algorithms, it does not bar patenting 
                                                                                                                                       
106. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
107. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
108. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
109. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) arts. 
52(2)(c), 52(3), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, 285, available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html#CVN. 
110. See Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, 2006 O.J. (C 157 E) 95 (report-
ing the July 6, 2005, rejection of the proposed directive on the patentability of software). 
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the application of an algorithm to a particular technical problem.111 
Differences in the validity of software patents in the U.S. and Europe 
has a potentially dramatic impact on open source licenses. As noted ear-
lier, open source licenses focus primarily on copyright. Unlike licenses 
for proprietary software, which typically indemnify licensees against 
patent infringement claims filed by third parties, open source licenses 
take a more modest approach, simply including a warranty of “prove-
nance” stating that the licensor believes that its contributions are original 
and noninfringing. The risk of patent liability is thus quite real. One 
study reports that the Linux kernel infringes 283 issued patents.112 There 
are, to be sure, many practical obstacles to the filing of patent infringe-
ment actions. Given the decentralized manner in which open source 
software is distributed, patent holders may well find it quite difficult to 
identify infringers. That said, some residual danger of liability remains, 
and the scope of this danger, of course, depends upon the validity of 
software patents, which in turn is completely dependent on national law. 
D. Arbitration as a Potential Solution 
One potential solution to the problems of nonuniversality and 
nonautonomy of open source software could be solved by committing 
the resolution of open source disputes to arbitration. So long as nations 
remain willing to compel arbitration and enforce arbitral awards, com-
mitting decisionmaking to arbitrators would allow the development of 
uniform principles independent from national law.  
1. Copyright 
Scholars have begun to call for the development of uniform, transna-
tional copyright norms independent of the laws of any national system 
through arbitration.113 The merits of developing such law in an arbitral 
                                                                                                                                       
111. See David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open Source: The Bat-
tle over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 13 & n.36 (2004), http://www. 
vjolt.net/vol9/issue3/v9i3_a10-Evans.pdf. 
112. See Sean Michael Kerner, Linux’s Patent Risk, INTERNETNEWS, Aug. 2, 2004, http:// 
www.internetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3389071. 
113. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create 
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 522–28 (2000). 
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forum draws support from the IBM-Fujitsu case,114 in which the arbitra-
tors were able to compensate for the undeveloped state of the law by 
fashioning remedies of their own.115  
Any such solution would be limited by the uncertainty about arbitra-
bility of copyright issues. Countries vary widely in the extent to which 
they permit arbitration of copyright-related issues. In the United States, 
it is now clear that copyright-related disputes are arbitrable.116 In Ka-
makazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that no public interest considerations existed 
that would prohibit arbitration of copyright infringement claims.117 In so 
holding, the court reserved judgment on the question of whether copy-
right validity was arbitrable, which the court appeared to acknowledge 
potentially raised more serious public interest concerns.118 
In Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue reserved by 
the Second Circuit in Kamakazi Music, holding that an arbitrator may 
determine the validity of a copyright when the issue arises in a copyright 
license lawsuit.119 The court noted that the Supreme Court did not con-
sider antitrust to raise a sufficient threat to public policy to justify pre-
venting arbitrability. Copyright raised even fewer public interest con-
cerns, since the “monopolies” granted by copyright were less 
problematic than those redressed by the antitrust laws, given that what-
ever market power a copyrighted work enjoyed could be easily circum-
                                                                                                                                       
114. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 13T-117-0636-85 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Commer-
cial Arb. Trib. Nov. 29, 1988) (Mnookin & Jones, arbs.) reprinted in 1 ARB. MATERIALS 5 
(1989). 
115. See Alisa E. Anderson, The Future of Software Copyright Protection: Arbitration v. Liti-
gation, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 17–32 (1989); Christian Bühring-Uhle, The IBM-
Fujitsu Arbitration: A Landmark in Innovative Dispute Resolution, 2 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 113 
(1991). Resolving these issues through arbitration necessarily forecloses an opportunity for judi-
cial development of the law, which would have greater precedential effect. See Ronald L. John-
son, The IBM-Fujitsu Arbitration Revisited—A Case Study in Effective ADR, COMPUTER LAW., 
May 1990, at 13, 16; John V. O’Hara, Comment, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dis-
pute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a “Better Way”?, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1749–50 (1988). 
116. See David W. Plant, Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Issues in the United States, in 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLDWIDE FORUM ON THE ARBITRATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 29, 36–38 (1994); William Grantham, Comment, The Arbi-
trability of International Intellectual Property Disputes, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 173, 216 
(1996). 
117. 684 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1982). 
118. Id. 
119. 816 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.). 
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vented by the creation of close substitutes.120 Furthermore, Congress had 
enacted legislation expressly authorizing the arbitration of patent valid-
ity. Given the more problematic nature of patents, copyright represented 
an a fortiori case.121 The Seventh Circuit reconfirmed this holding in 
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., which upheld an arbitration clause contained 
in a shrinkwrap license.122 Although courts occasionally invalidate arbi-
tration clauses in shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses because of uncon-
scionability or inadequate consent,123 they now have little hesitation in 
enforcing arbitration clauses in cases when the contract has been prop-
erly formed.124 
A recent survey of the arbitrability of copyright disputes in other 
countries revealed a wide variety of practices. Some countries, such as 
Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, follow the U.S. approach 
and permit arbitration of all aspects of software copyrights, including 
disputes over licensing, infringement, and validity.125 Other countries, 
such as Brazil, Israel, and Spain, permit arbitration over disputes about 
licensing and infringement, but do not permit arbitration of copyright 
validity.126 Still others, including China, do not permit arbitration of ei-
ther licensing disputes or validity.127 It is thus far from clear that the in-
clusion of arbitration clauses in open source licenses would necessarily 
provide open source software with the universality and autonomy asso-
ciated with the lex mercatoria. 
2. Patent 
Patent law poses even more difficult questions of arbitrability. Recent 
                                                                                                                                       
120. Id. at 1198–99. 
121. Id. at 1199.  
122. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
123. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–35 (2d Cir. 2002); Comb v. 
PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–77 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332, 1335–42 (D. Kan 2000); Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 235–37 (Ct. 
App. 2005); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573–75 (App. Div. 1998); Licitra 
v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 394–98 (Civ. Ct. 2001); DeFontes v. Dell Computers Corp., 
No. C.A. PC 03-2636, 2004 WL 253560 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2004). 
124. See In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000); 
Lieschke v. RealNetworks, Inc., No. 99 C 7274, 2000 WL 198424 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2000); 
Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000); 
Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 138–46 (Me. 2005). 
125. See Grantham, supra note 116, at 202, 208, 210–12. 
126. See id. at 216–19. 
127. See id. at 204.  
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surveys reveal a wide diversity of practices with respect to the arbitrabil-
ity of patent disputes.128 For example, while U.S. law has long been hos-
pitable to the arbitration of disputes over patent licenses,129 U.S. courts 
have taken a far different stance with respect to patent validity. The U.S. 
Supreme Court tangentially addressed the issue in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 
in which the Court eliminated a doctrine called “licensee estoppel” that 
until then barred anyone who had licensed a patent from challenging its 
validity.130 The Court saw the case as requiring a balance between two 
conflicting sets of policies. On the one hand were the policies underlying 
contract law, which enforced the intentions of the parties and attempted 
to prevent parties from repudiating their promises simply because they 
became dissatisfied with their bargain.131 On the other hand were the 
policies underlying patent law, which reflected “the important public in-
terest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which 
are in reality a part of the public domain.”132 The Court regarded the 
public interest embodied in patent law as more important and refused to 
allow language in a patent license to trump the licensee’s ability to chal-
lenge the validity of the license in court. In the words of the Court, “[w]e 
think it plain that the technical requirements of contract doctrine must 
give way before the demands of the public interest.”133 
For this reason, lower courts subsequently held that patent validity 
questions “are inappropriate for arbitration proceedings and should be 
decided by a court of law, given the great public interest in challenging 
invalid patents.”134 Indeed, one court found “universal agreement that, at 
least insofar as the issue of patent validity is concerned, arbitration is in-
appropriate.”135 
U.S. hostility toward arbitration of patent validity would end with the 
                                                                                                                                       
128. See M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 
19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 320–56 (2006); Grantham, supra note 116, at 199–220. 
129. See, e.g., Schweyer Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Regan Safety Devices Co., 4 F.2d 970, 974 (2d 
Cir. 1925). 
130. 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970); ac-
cord Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593–94 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. 
Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lessona Corp. v. Cotwool 
Mfg. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 141 (W.D.S.C. 1962), aff’d, 315 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1963); Zip Mfg. Co. 
v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 188 (D. Del. 1930). 
135. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
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enactment of 1982 legislation specifically permitting the arbitration of 
all patent validity, enforceability and infringement disputes.136 A 1984 
amendment further allowed arbitral resolution of a Patent Office pro-
ceeding known as an “interference,” through which current patent hold-
ers can contest a pending patent application.137 Since then, U.S. law has 
been largely open to arbitral resolution of patent disputes. 
The practices of other countries vary widely. Some countries, such as 
Belgium and Switzerland, appear to follow the U.S.’s approach and al-
low arbitration of both patent validity and licensing.138 Others, such as 
Brazil, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, appear to permit arbi-
tration of licensing issues, but prohibit arbitration of patent validity.139 
Still others, such as Canada, Germany, Israel, Japan, and the Nether-
lands, appear to permit arbitration of validity, but limit the enforcement 
of the arbitral judgment to the parties to the arbitration.140 Still others, 
such as China, effectively bar arbitration of any aspect of patent law.141 
These differences in various countries’ willingness to arbitrate patent-
related issues limit the extent to which arbitration can serve as an 
autonomous and universal basis for resolving patent disputes over open 
source technologies. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of a stateless, transnational, universal body of law gener-
ated from the bottom up by actual commercial practices has long cap-
tured the imagination of transnational law scholars. Tying the concept of 
Internet regulation to the long historical tradition associated with the lex 
mercatoria fosters a pragmatic sense of connectedness and legitimacy. 
Equally importantly, the vision that these norms would emerge from the 
bottom up outside the control of sovereign nations carries considerable 
appeal. The fact that many Internet scholars find the vision of the lex 
mercatoria enticing should also come as no surprise. Internet users have 
long shared a desire for uniform rules for global interoperability built on 
                                                                                                                                       
136. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (2000).  
137. Id. § 135(d). 
138. See Grantham, supra note 116, at 201–02, 211–12. 
139. See Smith et al., supra note 128, at 333; Grantham, supra note 116, at 206–07, 209, 216–
18, 219–20. 
140. See Smith et al., supra note 128, at 328–29, 330–31, 333–37, 339–40, 352, 354–55; 
Grantham, supra note 116, at 207–08, 210, 217, 218–19. 
141. See Smith et al., supra note 128, at 345–47; Grantham, supra note 116, at 204–05. 
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a foundation of decentralized, user-defined self-governance free from 
governmental interference. 
Upon closer inspection, debates about Internet self-governance run 
aground on many of the same issues that characterize the debate over the 
lex mercatoria. After all, e-commerce is just one of the different sectors 
of trade in which lex mercatoria is applied, since its rules are part of the 
basic sources of contemporary international business law. 
As enticing as the image of a spontaneous, universal, and autonomous 
legal order may be, the reality is that most legal systems retain, at differ-
ent speeds, a number of deep interdependencies with national law and its 
control mechanisms. Given the controversies that have long surrounded 
the original debates about the lex mercatoria, that attempts to extend the 
same concepts into Internet governance would run afoul of the same 
problems should come as no surprise. 
